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LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS
MADE BY
"INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS"
MERTON PERSON *
INTRODUCTION
There are two ways of getting a job done. The person who wants it
done can do it himself by his own efforts, management and hired help; or
he can bargain with someone else for the desired result. When he hires per-
sonal services and retains the management of the enterprise he is called a
"master," the person hired is called a "servant," and the master is liable for
what the servant does in the master's behalf. But when one bargains for a given
result he does not then become a master, the person bargained with is called
an independent contractor, and he does not act in behalf of the employer.'
The well known doctrine of Respondeat Superior does not apply in this lat-
ter situation.2
Let us notice in some detail the factual differences between these two
methods of getting things done, and then let us compare the liability of one
who employs a servant with the liability of one whc bargains with an inde-
pendent contractor.
There is a definite and factual difference between the behavior (i.e., the
acts and efforts) of a person, and the results which he attains by his behavior.
There is a corresponding difference between hiring the behavior of a person
and buying the results of his endeavor. For instance, the behavior of a man
in building a carriage is something different from the carriage he produces.
There is nothing astute in drawing a distinction between the hiring of serv-
ices to be used in building a carriage, and buying a carriage-the product of
services.
In some transactions it is not easy to make out whether services have
been hired or the result of services has been bought. The result aimed at and
bargained for with an independent contractor is not always a tangible thing,
as it was in the carriage illustration; it may be something that has no tangible
form. The salesman, for instance, goes about persuading persons .to buy this
or that. It often is a nice question whether the employer has hired the serv-
• Frank It Rand Professor of Law, Visiting 1949-50, Vanderbilt University.
1. The word employer is here used in a sense that includes one who bargains for a
result as well as one who hires services.
2. HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933)..
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ices of the salesman or has bought a result-viz., a persuaded customer. The
readiness of such a customer to sign on the dotted line is a result distinct
from the services that brought it about; it can be bought from an independent
contractor. 3
The factual distinction between "servants" and "independent conitrac-
tors" does not appear in the literal meaning of the respective terms. The
servant is usually a contractor; by contract he sells his services. The inde-
pendent contractor on the other hand may not be a contractor. The broker,
for instance, does not usually contract to do anything. He merely has an offer
looking forward to a unilateral contract whereby the employer will become
bound if the broker procures a customer.4 The broker is not obligated either
before or after he effects a sale. Thus we have "independent contractors"
who are not contractors, and we have "servants" who are contractors.
What is it that marks the difference between a servant and an inde-
pendent contractor-and the corresponding difference between a master and
one who bargains with an independent contractor? It is this: the master has
a right to control the acts of his servant, but the person who bargains with an
independent contractor has not a right to control in detail the acts of his
independent contractor. This generalization will not be further developed
for the reason that it is fully expounded in numerous textbooks and judicial
opinions.5 No attempt is made here to defend the control test. It is simply
accepted.
The control test marks the difference between servants and non-servants.
The independent contractor is a non-servant. He is like a servant, however,
in that his work is instigated by an employer; and he is generally paid by his
employer. For these reasons, it is more difficult to distinguish him 'from serv-
ants than it is in the cases of other non-servants.
The terms "servant" and "independent contractor" are convenient and
they are so imbedded in the law that they must be used. A word of caution,
however, may not be amiss. It cannot be assumed that when a worker has
been called "servant" or "independent contractor" his status has been perma-
3. Barton v. Studebaker Corp., 46 Cal. App. 707, 189 Pac. 1025 (1920). Speaking
of an automobile salesman who was not subject to control by his employer with respect
to the manner in which he did his work, the court said: "He was as much engaged in
business for himself when prosecuting the work called for by his contract with the
corporation as is the contractor who engages to construct a building for a stipulated
sum of money." Numerous decisions to the same effect are collected in Notes, 61 A. L. R.
223,229 (1929) ; 107 A. L. R. 419 (1937) ; 17 A. L. R. 621 (1922) ; 29 A. L. R. 470 (1924);
54 A. L. R. 627 (1928).
4. Elliott v. Kazajian, 255. Mass. 459, 152 N. E. 351 (1926) ; Stensgaard v. Smith,
43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669 (1890); Patton v. Wilson, 220 S. W. 2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949); Roberts v. Harrington, 168 Wis. 217, 169 N W. 603 (1918).
5. Aldritt v. Gillette-Herzog Mfg. Co., 85 Minn. 206, 88 N. W. 741 (1902); Flori
v. Dolph, 192 S. W. 949 (Mo. 1917); Lake v. Bennett, 41 R. I. 154, 103 Atl. 145 (1918);
Cunningham v. The International R. R., 51 Tex. 503 (1879) ; Stagg v. Taylor's Adm'x,
119 Va. 266, 89 S. E. 237 (1916); HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933); HUFFCUT, AGENCY
9 (2d ed. 1901); PRossER, ToRTs 473 (1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENcY § 2 (1933); see
Note, 19 A. L. R. 226, 235 (1922).
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nently fixed. The behavior of one who is employed cannot be treated as a
unit. Some segments of his behavior are done within and some outside his
employment. He steps back and forth from one role to another. We call one
and the same person "servant" when he is doing one act, "agent" when he is
doing another and "independent contractor" when he is doing another. A
person sent out to sell and repair washing machines, for example, could be
an independent contractor in getting from one customer to another; he could
be a servant in demonstrating or repairing machines; and he could be an
agent in making contracts for his company.6 He cannot be branded as with
a scarlet letter that fixes and proclaims his status in everything he does.
The factual difference between a servant and an independent contractor
has been noted. What legal consequence depends on the distinction? It is
simply this: the doctrine of Respondeat Superior applies when the act in
question is done by a servant; it does not apply when the act is done by an
independent contractor. It will be noted presently that an employer may be
liable for what his independent contractor does, but such liability must rest
on something other than the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. The doctrine
of Respondeat Superior is accounted for historically as a doctrine appertain-
ing to personal service.7 It is rationalized on the basis of holding the entre-
preneur.8 It is defined and limited in scope by the "control test"9-- i.e., it
does not apply unless the employer had a right to control the employee. By
these tokens the doctrine of Respondeat Superior does not apply to acts done
by an independent contractor. 10
The difference between a servant and an independent contractor is
blurred by a double use of the term "employment." That term and the phrase
6. "This change of dress from "servant' to 'agent' is not alone so disquieting. It, of
course, has long been possible for the 'independent contractor', without causing undue
comment, to appear also in the guise of an 'agent', as witness the factors, brokers, banks
and other similar organizations which act to change the contractual relations of their
employers by buying or selling goods or stock or collecting comhmercial paper, and yet
which are solely responsible not only for the wages of their employees, but for their torts
as well." Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 501,
514 (1935) (italics added). An "agent" is distinguished from both "servants" and "in-
dependent contractors" by the fact that an agent does juristic acts for his employer
while a servant or independent cofitractor does non-juristic acts for his employer. See
Ferson, Agency to Make Representations, 2 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1948); FERSON, THE
RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS 227-42 (1949).
7. Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REv. 345, 5 id. 1 (1891).
8. TIFFANY, AGENCY 100 (2d ed., Powell, 1924). See also Douglas, Vicarious Lia-
bility and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584 (1929); Note, 20 COL. L. REv. 333
(1920). Professor Harper, speaking of independent contractors, says: "It is the con-
tractor rather than the contractee who is the entrepreneur and who should ordinarily
carry the risk." HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933).
9. Aldritt v. Gillette-Herzog Mfg. Co., 85 Minn. 206, 88 N. W. 741 (1902) ; HARPER,
TORTS § 292 (1933); HUFFCUT, AGENCY 9 (2d ed. 1901); 1 MECHEM, AGENCY § 40
(2d ed. 1914) ; PROSSER, TORTS 473 (1941).
10. "Social policy would seem to afford a justification for the application of the rule
of respondeat superior to cases of injuries caused by all independent contractors and their
servants. . . . Such a rule, however, we do not have nor are we likely to have it
immediately." Harper, The Basis of the Iinunnity of an Employer of af Independent
Contractor, 10 IND. L. J. 494, 499 (1935). And see infra p. 6.
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"scope of employment" are commonly used in speaking of servants, but courts
sometimes use the same language in speaking of independent contractors."
The common practice of digesting the independent contractor cases along
with the servant cases, under the general heading of Master and Servant,
also tends to blur their difference. We should not be misled into the idea that
the theoretical basis for the employer's liability is the same in both types of
cases.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING LIABILITY
OF EMPLOYERS FOR ACTS OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
Several authors have ably marshaled the cases that deal with the liability
of employers for acts of their independent contractors; and, have found in
those cases some general principles. It will be shown later that these prin-
ciples are applicable when an independent contractor has made representa-
tions for his employer. Let us first note in brief outline what the studies
made by these authors reveal.
Dean Prosser says,12 "For the torts of an independent contractor, as
distinguished from a servant, it has long been said to be the general rule that
there is no vicarious liability upon the employer." But, he adds, "The Ameri-
can courts . . . have whittled away at the rule of non-liability with excep-
tions, to the point where it is not easy to say that any 'general rule' remains."
Then he notes the following exceptions to the general rule: (a) where the
employer is negligent in connection with the work to be done, e.g., where lie
does not use care to select a competent contractor; (b) where the employer
is under a non-delegable duty to the peison who later is injured by the con-
tractor; and, (c) where the work to be done is "intrinsically dangerous."
This last exception, says he, "seems to be limited to work in which there is
a high degree of risk, or some rather specific danger to those in the vicinity,
recognizable in advance as calling, for definite precautions." He adds that
the employer is not liable for "collateral" or "casual" negligence on the part
of the contractor.
Professor Harper's statement 3 regarding an employer's liability for
acts of his independent contractor is substantially like the one made by Dean
Prosser. He also uses the negative-with-exceptions form of statement.
Mr. Stephen Chapman formulates the duty of one who employs an in-
dependent contractor like this: "If I am under a duty to a person or a class
of persons and I fail to perform that duty, whereby damage results, I am
liable .. . and I cannot evade that liability by delegating the performance
11. Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Co., 112 F. 2d 271 (7th Cir. 1940).
12. PROSsER, TORTS § 64 (1941).
13. HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933).
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of the duty to an independent contractor. . . . In other words, the whole
test is whether I am under a duty which has not been performed, and it mat-
ters not whether that duty is one imposed by statute or by contract or by
common law in tort.' 4
American writers conservatively and accurately follow the form of
statement that appears in the cases. They say that the employer of an inde-
pendent contractor is not liable for what the independent contractor does.
Then they follow this negative rule with large exceptions. "Indeed," says
Chief Justice Gallager of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, 15 "it would be
proper to say that the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the
catalog of its exceptions."
This negative-with-exceptions form of statement is inapt. In the first
place it is circuitous. In the second place it makes it appear that the employer's
non-liability (so far as it exists) for acts of his independent contractor is an
exception from the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. But the employer's
liability-or lack of it-for what his independent contractor does is no part
of the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. It has a foundation of its own that
is separate and apart from the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.
MXIr. Chapman does not use the negative-with-exceptions form of state-
ment and he decries its use by others. Says he: "[S]uch a method of dealing
with the subject is misleading and unscientific. The statement of law in which
it results may or may not be broadly accurate, but no sort of principle emerges
which can be taken as a test, in varying circumstances, of whether or not a
person is liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor. . . . It
seldom conduces to clarity to start with a negative proposition and then graft
onto it positive exceptions.' 6 It seems more simple and forthright to discuss
the liability of employers of independent contractors from the positive side
and to note its independence of the doctrine of Respondeat Superior.
LIABILITY NOT VICARIOUS
An employer's liability for what his independent contractor does is not
vicarious in the sense that the employer is being held for acts that were done
by his vicar or substitute. And his liability is not vicarious in the sense that
he is made to pay for injuries that he had no part in bringing about. Let us
run down the list of "exceptions." We note that the employer is held: when
lie does not use due care in selecting his independent contractor; when the
plans he furnishes call for an unreasonable risk; when his supervision is in-
adequate; and, when, by contract or otherwise, he is under a non-delegable
14. Chapman, Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors, 50 L. Q. REv.
71, 75 (1934).
15. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 277 N. W.
226, 228 (1937). See also Harper, supra note 10, at 500.
16. Chapman, supra note 14, at 71, 75.
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duty. The reason for holding him in these cases is clear. Now we come to the
"exception" whereby he is liable if the work he bargains for is "inherently
dangerous." "The principle seems to be limited to work in which there is a
high degree of risk, or rather some specific danger to those in the vicinity,
recognizable in advance as calling for definite precautions. 1" 7 Mr. Chapman
limits the employer's liability to cases where he is under a duty to a person
or class of persons and he fails to perform that duty. Says he: "The whole
test is whether I am under a duty which has not been performed."' 8 It
seems clear from the statements quoted, and others, that if the employ-
ment creates a special risk to particular persons or groups of persons the
employer is held if the injury that he should have apprehended occurs. When,
however, the point is reached where the special and foreseeable risk that the
employer has bargained to have created comes to an end, his liability ends.
His liability beyond that point would be vicarious and, accordingly, "the em-
ployer is liable only for risks inherent in the work itself, and not for 'col-
lateral' or 'casual' negligence on the part of the contractor."'1
LIABILITY NOT ABSOLUTE
The liability" of an employer, as outlined above, falls short of being "ab-
solute liability." Says Professor Harper, "In the case in which the contractee
is held liable for wrongs of the contractor, the former is liable only when the
contractor or his servants have been guilty of some misconduct. '20 And Mr.
Chapman, after referring to a number of explanations of cases where em-
ployers were held for what independent contractors had done, says that these
explanations "are to a certain extent misleading in that they suggest that it
is only where there would be an exceptionally stringent, even absolute, lia-
bility on a person acting himself that he is liable for the acts of an inde-
pendent contractor. It is submitted respectfully that this is not so: there is
nothing in the passages above cited to suggest that the duties there referred
to were intended only to mean absolute or eyen exceptional duties; on the
contrary, even the comparatively low cast duty to take reasonable care is said
to be sufficient."121
The employer's liability for what, his independent contractor does in
these exceptional situations falls short also of holding him to the same extent
as though he were a master. Servants and independent contractors are dif-
ferent. A prop9sition to identify them in the eyes of the law, "cannot," says
Parke, B., "be maintained to its full extent without overturning some deci-
sions and producing consequence- which wnuld. as Lord Tenterden observes,
17. PROSSER, TORTS 488 (1941).
18. Chapman, supra note 14, at 75.
19. PROSSER, TORTS 488 (1941).
20. HARPER, TORTS 651 (1933).
21. Chapman, supra note 14, at 74.
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.shock the common sense of all men' . . . the purchaser of an article at a
shop, which he had ordered the shopman to bring home for him, might be
made responsible for an injury committed by the shopman's carelessness
whilst passing along the street. ' 22 And. we may add, if the doctrine of Re-
spondeat Superior were applied in all cases where one employs an independent
contractor it would seem to make the person who hires a taxicab liable for
carelessness of the driver. It would seem to make the sender of a telegram
liable for carelessness of the delivery boy as he rides along the street on his
bicycle carrying the sender's message.
RATIONAL BASIS
It has been noted that the employer of an independent contractor is
liable in many instances for acts that are done by the hand of another. But
the basis and qualifications of that liability are not found in the doctrine of
Respondeat Superior. In some of the "exceptions" (i.e., cases where he is
liable) the reason is obvious. The employer has been remiss. Can we account
for his liability in cases where the injury resulted from bungling by the in-
dependent contractor or his servants? Suppose that A hires B as an inde-
pendent contractor to break neighbor Y's window. A would be liable to Y.
Suppose that A hires B to create a particular and obvious risk that Y's win-
dow will be broken. It is rational that A should be liable to B if the foresee-
able injury occurs. And so when A hires B as an independent contractor to
blast stumps in the vicinity of Y's window A is liable if the operation as
carried out, breaks Y's window. 23 The difference is small between hiring B
to break the window and bargaining for the creation of an obvious and spe-
cial risk that the window will be broken.
Suppose further that A hires B as an independent contractor to defraud
Y. A would be liable for the injury to Y. And if A hires B as an independent
contractor to work on Y and persuade him to buy a piece of property, he
bargains for the creation of a particular risk that Y will be defrauded. A
should be, and by cases to be cited later is, held liable if Y suffers the foresee-
able injury. It seems rational that the person who bargains for the creation
of such a risk should be liable when the foreseeable injury occurs.
REPRESENTATIONS BY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Now where do representations made by an independent contractor fit
into the general picture of an employer's responsibility for what his inde-
pendent contractor does? Since representations are often mistaken for
22. Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, 510, 151 Eng. Rep. 509, 514 (Ex. 1840).
23. J. C. Carland & Co. v. Burke, 197 Ala. 435, 73 So. 10 (1916); Giem v. Williams,
222 S.W. 2d 800 (Ark. 1949) ; City of Chicago v. Murdock, 212 Il. 9, 72 N.E. 46 (1904);
Freebury v. Chicago 2%. & P. S. R. R., 77 Wash. 464, 137 Pac. 1044 (1914).
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juristic acts-such as the making of a contract-it is well to recall that they
are definitely non-juristic acts. Unlike juristic acts, they are not an exercise
of autonomy. They are not made with an intent to bind the speaker (or any-
one) in contract, to transfer his property or otherwise to subtract from his
legal position. Their legal effect is imposed by law regardless of any real or
apparent consent to be bound.24 The physical aspect of a representation and
the act of blasting a stump are so different that it may seem queer to compare
the two; but a little reflection will reveal that they both are non-juristic acts.
And both fall within the purview of the general principles stated above with
regard to an employer's liability for the acts of his independent contractor.
When an independent contractor is hired to make representations in order to
persuade the person addressed to do this or that, it creates a special, peculiar
and obvious risk that the person so addressed may be fooled by a misrepre-
sentation and so injured. It is a "specific danger recognizable in advance."
A broker, for example, is sometimes hired to sell (i.e., persuade a customer
to buy) a piece of property; he is rewarded when by his representation he
attains that result. A physician is sometimes hired to make representations
to an injured employee and thus to induce him to settle. A telegraph company
is sometimes hired by an offeror to make a representation to the offeree for
the purpose of getting the offeree to act. These illustrations will be amplified
later. In all such cases there is a special and obvious risk that the represen-
tations may not be truly and accurately made, and that harm to the particular
addressee may be the result.
Should an employer be held responsible when his independent contractor
carelessly or willfully bungles the job of making a representation? That is
the question here being discussed. What the legal consequences of charging
him with a misrepresentation should be is a separate question. 5 Such con-
sequences are varied. When, for example, an offer is made by telegraph and
the telegram as delivered to the addressee is different from the telegram
delivered for transmission, the sender may be bound by the terms of the
proposal as contained in the telegram delivered to the addressee. That is, the
sender may be estopped to deny that the terms of the offer he made were
in accord with the message delivered. In the newspaper cases the person who
procures a representation to be made by a newspaper publisher may be
held for libel if the representation as made is libelous. In the physician cases
the employer may be held in tort if the victim was misled to his harm by the
physician's false representation. And, in the broker cases the employer may
be held for deceit, or else the injured party may be allowed to rescind the
transaction if false representations are made by the broker. We are here con-
24. For fuller exposition see FERsox, RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS 60-83, 225-
42 (1949).
25. For similar distinction see Ferson, .Agency to Make Rcpresentalions, 2 VAND.
L. Rav. 1 (1948); FERsoN, RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRACTS, C. 12 (1949).
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sidering broadly whether the employer should be charged in one way or an-
other with misrepresentations made by his independent contractor. -
Let us check the foregoing theory against the cases where employers have
procured representations to be made by such independent contractors as tele-
graph companies, physicians, brokers and newspaper publishers.
THE TELEGRAPH CASES -
The facts in one case 26 will serve to illustrate a problem that has come
before the courts time and again. 27 In this illustrative case, Mr. Ayer, a
would-be seller of laths who lived in Bangor, Maine, filed a telegram with
the Western Union Telegraph Company addressed to his correspondent in
Philadelphia. The message read as follows: "Will sell 800 M. laths, delivered
at your wharf two ten net cash. July shipment. Answer quick." The message
that was delivered to the addressee in Philadelphia read like this: "Will sell
800 M. laths delivered at your wharf two net cash. July shipment. Answer
quick." It will be seen that the important word "ten" in the statement of price
was omitted from the message delivered. The Philadelphia party, relying on
the message he received, accepted the proposal and later insisted that he was
entitled to the laths at $2.00 per thousand. This raises the question of whether
the sender of the message should be held according to the version that was
delivered to the addressee.
Stating the case more analytically, Mr. Ayer filed a telegram with the
Western Union Company and thus did two things: (1) He offered to sell
laths at $2.10 per thousand--i.e., he indicated his consent that he should be-
come bound to sell at that price; (2) he said to the Company; "You tell my
correspondent in Philadelphia that I offered to sell him laths at $2.10 per
thousand." The message delivered to the Philadelphia party was a misrepre-
sentation. It stated the price to be $2.00 per thousand. Should Mr. Ayer be
estopped to contradict the terms of the message that was received by the
addressee after the addressee has accepted in reliance on those terms?28 The
answer to that question, as given by the courts and legal writers, is not clear.
The conflict among the authorities is well described by Judge Ailshire. He
says, "We have made a very careful and somewhat -extended examination
both of the text writers and the court decisions on this question, and emerge
26. Ayer v. Western U. Tel. Co; 79 Me. 493, 10 A-tl. 495 (1887).
27. The question generally comes up in cases where a 'sender of a message has sued
the telegraph company for the damages he claims to have suffered owing to the faulty
transmission of the message. The amount'of recovery in such a case depends on whether
the sender was bound according to the message delivered to the addressee.
28. If the addressee, in such a case, should have known that the message he re-
ceived was a misrepresentation qf the terms of the offer he was not reasonably misled.
and cannot hold the offeror to the terms stated in the garbled message. Germain Fruit
Co. v. Western U. Tel. Co., 137 Cal. 598, 70 Pac. 658 (1902).
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from the investigation fully convinced that the authorities are irreconcilable
on the question." 29
Courts commonly approach the problem as though its solution depends
on whether there was a master and servant relation between the sender of the
message and the telegraph company or its employees.30
It is demonstrable that the sender does not stand in the relation of mas-
ter, either as to the telegraph company or as to its employees. "As a matter
of fact," says Judge Hoke of the North Carolina Supreme Court, "we know
that neither the sender nor the addressee has any control over the operations
of the coinpany or its methods."' 31 And says Judge Folkes of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, "The parties who resort to this instrumentality . .. have
no opportunity, and no power, to supervise or direct the manner or means
which the company use in the discharge of their duties to the public in the
transmission of messages for particular individuals."32 Some courts bolster
the idea that the telegraph company is an independent contractor by noting
29. Strong v. Western U. Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 Pac. 910, 917 (1910). See
also 2 U. OF CIx. L. Rav. 105 (1928); 18 COL. L. RE%. 364 (1918); 27 YALE L. J.
932 (1918).
30. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co., 114 Ga. 576, 40 S. E.
815 (1902); Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 Pac. 910 (1910);
McKee v. Western Union Tel. Co., 158 Ky. 143, 164 S. W. 348 (1914); Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. Schaefer, 110 Ky. 907, 62 S. W. 1119 (1901) ; Holtz v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 294 Mass. 543, 3 N. E. 2d 180 (1936) ; Shingleur Vr. Western Union Tel. Co.,
72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. 425 (1895); Mt. Gilead Cotton Oil Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 171 N. C. 705, 89 S. E. 21 (1916) ; Pegram v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 N. C.
28, 6 S. E. 770 (1888); Harper v. Western Union, 133 S. C. 55, 130 S. E. 119, 42
A. L. R. 286 (1925); Pepper v. Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. 783 (1889) ; Hulme
v. Levis-Zuloski Co., 149 S. W. 781 (Tex. Civ.oApp. 1912); Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6
Ex. 7 (1870).
"If the telegraph company becomes the agent of the sender for the purposes of the
message, then under the legal maxim, qui facit per aline facit per se, he is responsible
for all the errors of the company and is bound by the terms of the message as received."
Tiedeman, Contracts By Telegraph, 12 CENT. L. J. 365 (1881).
"Was there here a consensus? Consensus may be by the parties themselves or by
their authorized agents. Here there was ... no consent unless the telegraph officers
are to be considered as authorized agents of the sender." Lord Neaves, in Verdin
Brothers v. Robinson, 10 Sess. Cas. (3d ser.) 35 (Scot. 1871).
31. Mt. Gilead Cotton Oil Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171 N. C. 705, 89 S. E.
21, 22 (1916).
32. Pepper v. Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 560, 11 S. W. 783, 784 (1889). See also
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Schaefer, 110 Ky. 907, 62 S. W. 119 (1901) ; Holtz v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 294 Mass. 543, 3 N. E. 2d 180 (1936); Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6
Ex. 7 (1870).
"[T]he relation between the sender and the telegraph company is not that of'
principal "and agent in the usual sense of those terms but rather that of employer and
independent contractor. . ." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F. 2d 103,
107 (8th Cir. 1927). See also Strong v. Western Union, 18 Idaho 389, 109 Pac. 910
(1910); McKee v. Western Union, 158 Ky. 143, 164 S. W. 348 (1914) ; Shingleur v.
Western Union, 72 Miss. 1030, 18 So. 425 (1895) ; Barnett v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
287 S. W. 1064 (Mo. App. 1926); Pegram v. Western Union, 100 N. C. 28, 6 S. E.
770 (1888); Eureka Cotton Mills v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 S. C. 498, 70 S. E.
1040 (1911) ; Verdin Brothers v. Robinson, 10 Sess. Cas. (3d ser.) 35 (Scot. 1871).
And cases cited infra note 35.
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that it renders a public service.33 It is compared with railroads and charac-
terized as a "carrier of intelligence. '3 4
Many courts after finding that the telegraph company is an inde-
pendent contractor hold that the sender of a message is not liable for mis-
takes made in its transmission.35 The reasoning is that the sender is not a
master. The doctrine of Respondeat Superior, therefore, does not apply, and
so that ends the matter. If there is no theory other than that of Respondeat
Superior on which the sender can be held, the result reached by these courts
seems inevitable.
A considerable number of decisions, however, hold that one who makes
an offer by telegraph is responsible for the version of the message that reaches
the offeree.3 6 One author says, "The weight of American authority and the
better view make the sender responsible for the mistake of the Telegraph
Company." 37 Since the telegraph company is so obviously an independent
contractor, how can the sender be held liable for its mistakes? By what theory
and on what considerations do courts reach that result?
The theoretical basis for this "American doctrine" holding the sender
has been variously stated. Some courts, undeterred by the sender's lack of
control over the company and its servants, have deemed the company an
"agent" of the sender.38 Other courts have vaguely supported these decisions
33. Holtz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 294 Mass. 543, 3 N. E. 2d 180 (1936);
Pepper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. 783, 4 L. R. A. 660 (1889).
34. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F. 2d 103, 106 (8th Cir. 1927);
Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 389, 109 Pac. 910 (1910); Harper v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 133 S. C. 55, 130 S. E. 119 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 286; Eureka
Cotton Mills v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 S. C. 498, 70 S. E. 1040 (1911); Pepper
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W. 783, 4 L. R. A. 660 (1889).
35. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F. 2d 103 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Strong
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 409, 109 Pac. 910 (1910); Postal Tel. Co. v.
Schaefer, 110 Ky. 907, 62 S. W. 1119 (1901) ; Holtz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 294
Mass. 543, 3 N. E. 2d 180 (1936); Leigh v. Western Union Tel. Co., 190 N. C. 700,
130 S. E. 728 (1925); Mt. Gilead Cotton Oil Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 171 N. C.
705, 89 S. E. 21 (1916); Harper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 133 S. C. 55, 130 S. E.
119, 42 A. L. R. 286 (1925) ; Pepper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S. W.
783 (1889); Henkel v. Pape, L. R. 6 Ex. 7 (1870).
36. "When . . . the offer is made by telegraph, and the telegram as delivered to
the addressee is materially different from the telegram delivered for transmission, the
sender is bound by the terms of the proposal as contained in the telegram delivered to
the addressee." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co., 114 Ga. 576, 40
S. E. 815 (1902). See cases cited infra notes 38, 39, 40 and 41.
37. Note, 27 YALE L. J. 932, 933 (1918).
38. Des Arc Oil Mill v. Western Union Tel. Co., 132 Ark. 335, 201 S. W. 273,
6 A. L. R. 1081 (1918); Brooke v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Ga. 694, 46 S. E. 826
(1904); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co., 114 Ga. 576, 40 S. E.
815, 817 (1902); Butler v. Folly, 211 Mich. 668, 179 N. W. 34 (1920) ; Price Brokerage
Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 199 S. W. 732 (Mo. App. 1917); Hamubelt Bros. v.
Rea & P. Mill Co., 77 Mo. App. 672 (1899); New York & Washington Printing Tel.
Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298, 302 (1860); Hulme v. Levis-Zuloski Mercantile Co., 149
S. W. 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Sherrerd v. Western Union,, 146 Wis. 197, 131
N. W. 341 (1911); Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431 (1876).
The telegraph company is, of course, an agency in the sense of a means used to
transmit messages. But it is not an "agent" or "servant" in the technical sense. A
similar confusion of the terms "agent" and "agency" appears in an opinion of Judge
Scott Ladd, where he was considering the post office as well as a telegraph company.
Lucas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 131 Iowa 669. 109 N. W. 191 (1906).
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by resorting to "public policy,"3 9 "commercial expediency" 40 and an "ad-
mixture of justice and natural equity. ' 41 Judge Phillips, speaking of two
leading cases which hold the sender says: "It will be noted that neither of
these opinions predicates the conclusion reached upon any definite principle
Of law."1
42
These ingenious explanations that have been resorted to indicate a feel-
ing on the part of judges that one who makes an offer by telegraph should be
held according to the version of the message that is delivered. But when a
candid view of the facts has revealed that the doctrine of Respondeat Su-
perior did not apply, it has seemed to leave the desired result without a solid
theoretical basis.
There is a doctrine, however, that affords a solid theoretical basis for
holding the offeror. Let it be conceded that the telegraph company is an inde-
pendent contractor. The cases here being discussed fall within that extensive
area where an employer is liable for acts procured to be done by his inde-
pendent contractor. The offeror has procured a representation to be made
to a specific person and for the very purpose of inducing him to act. The em-
ployer has thus bargained for the creation of a risk that the addressee may
be misled to his injury. The situation is within the purview of the general
doctrine stated above 3 with regard to the liability of employers for acts of
their independent contractors.
39. "It-is evident that in case of an error in the transmission of a telegram either
the sender-or receiver must often suffer loss. As between the two, upon whom should
the loss finally fall? We think the safer nd more equitable rule, and the rule the
public can most easily adapt itself to, is that, as between sender and receiver, the party
who selects the telegraph as the means of communication shall bear the loss caused by
the errors of the telegraph. The first proposer can select one of many modes of com-
munication, both for the proposal and the answer. The receiver has no such choice,
except as to his answer. If he cannot safely act upon the message he receives through
the agency selected by the proposer, business must be seriously hampered and delayed
The use of the telegraph has become so general, and so many transactions are based
on the words of the telegram received, that any other rule woul! now be impracticable."
Ayers v. Western Union Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495, 497 (1887).
40. Jackson, C. J., of the Georgia Supreme Court says, "Whether the telegraphic
operator be the agent of the sender of a dispatch, so as to bind him, is a debatable
question in the courts, the English authorities being to the effect that he is not; and
the American mainly that he is. We agree with the American doctrine, at least to the
extent that commercial transactions being now conducted to so great an extent through
the telegraph, a merchant would lose business and credit if he did not settle in accord-
ance with the offer actually made, though by mistake of the agency he used to convey
it, and when he does so settle in good faith, and is induced to do so by the negligence
of the telegraphic company, through its servants, that company should respond to him
in damages, whether absolutely bound by his contract or not." 'Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760, 767 (1883).
41. Judge Cobb of the Georgia Supreme Court in upholding a decision that the
sender should be held responsible, justified his position in these words: "It may be
said, however, that the decision, though possibly subject to the criticism that it is not
entirely consonant with established principles of law, does have for its foundation an
admixture of justice and natural equity." Western Union Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber
Co., 114 Ga. 576, 40 S. E. 815, 818 (1902).
42. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cowvin & Co., 20 F. 2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1927).
43. Supra p. 4.
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THE PHYSICIAN CASES
Is a physician in the practice of his profession a servant or an inde-
pendent contractor? That question is of no importance in the common case
where the employer is the patient. The same degree of care and skill on the
part of the doctor would be required whether he is a servant or an independent
contractor. But when an employer hires a doctor to work on a third person,
the employer's liability may depend on whether the doctor is a servant or an
independent contractor.
The question posed above has come up in different types of cases. It is
almost uniformly held that the physician is not a servant of the persol or
company that employs him.44 In a Tennessee case45 the circumstances were
that an employing company called in a physician to attend an employee who
had been injured. The physician thus brought in was alleged to have been
negligent and to have harmed the employee. Said Beard, J.: "Plaintiff in
error insists that the defendant in error is liable for the mistakes or mal-
practice of the surgeons in question; that their employment by the railroad
created the relation of master and servant. . . . We do not think so ...
They were not employed to do ordinary corporate work, but to render serv-
ices requiring special training, skill and experience. To perform these services
so as to make them effectual for the saving of life and limb, it was necessary
that. these surgeons should bring to their work not only their best skill, but
the right to exercise it in accordance with their soundest judgment and
without interference." 46
In a Massachusetts. case 47 the facts were these: the plaintiff had been
injured in an accident and had sued the defendant company; and the de-
fendant sent a doctor to examine the plaintiff. The doctor told the plaintiff
to "try standing on his leg." The plaintiff tried it, fell and was seriously in-
jured hy the fall. "The doctor," said Holmes, C. J., "was not an agent or
servant of the defendant in making his examination. He was an independent
contractor. There is no more distinct calling than that of the doctor, and none
in which the employ6 is more distinctly free from the control or direction of
his employer. In this case the doctor was informing himself, according to the
suggestions of his own judgment, in order to advise and perhaps to testify for
the defendant. We must assume, in the absence of other evidence than his
profession and his purpose, that what he should do and how he should do it
44. Boring v. Chicago & E. R. R., 185 Ind. 46, 110 N. E. 545, 113 N. E. 294
(1915-16) ; Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry., v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83, 40 N. E. 138 (1895) ;
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Zeiler, 54 Kan. 340. 38 Pac. 282 (1894); Haggerty v.
St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. R., 100 Mo. App. 426, 74 S. W. 456 (1903) ; Quinn v. Kansas
City, M. & B. R. R., 94 Tenn. 713, 30 S. W. 1036 (1895).
45. Quinn v. Kansas City, M. &.B. R. R., 94 Tenn. 713, 30 S. W. 1036 (1895).
46. Id. at 716, 718, 30 S. W. at 1037.
47. Pearl v. West End St. Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339 (1900).
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was left wholly to him."'48 And where a company maintains a hospital and
employs physicians as part of a relief program, the physicians are not deemed
to be servants of the company. 49 It has been held in a good many cases where
hospitals have employed physicians to care for the hospital's patients that
the physicians are independent contractors. 50
It thus appears that a physician, hired to render professional service,
does his work as an independent contractor-not as a servant. The reason
for this is that it is incompatible that the physician can have freedom to prac-
tice his art and at the same time be subject to the control of his employer.
The next question is whether one who employs a doctor-an independent
contractor-to work on a third person shall be charged with the doctor's
negligence or lack of skill. The employer's liability in these cases should de-
pend on the same considerations as are applicable generally to an employer's
liability for acts of his independent contractor. He is, of course, liable when
he-the employer-is careless in the selection of the physician.5 1 And he is
liable in case he is under a non-delegable duty to the third person which duty
is violated through the maltreatment administered by the physician. Hospitals,
for example, are under a non-delegable duty to their paying patients and so
are generally liable for the carelessness or lack of skill on the part of doctors
hired by the hospital to care for such patients.52 Employers also are in some
situations under a non-delegable duty to care for their employees.
In other cases the employer's liability depends on what he hired the
doctor to do. Hiring a doctor to treat the ailments and improve the health
of a third person does not render the employer liable for the negligence or
lack of skill on the part of the doctor.53 But suppose the physician was hired
to examine a patient, and thus to procure information for his employer. Such
an examination involves a special and foreseeable risk to the particular
patient. That risk is created for the benefit of the employer-not for the benefit
of the patient. Is the employer liable if the doctor in making the examination
48. 57 N. E. at 339.
49. Union Pac. Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894); Tutino v. Ford Motor
Co., 111 N. J. L. 435, 168 At. 749 (1933). See also Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Whit-
ney, 62 Fla. 124, 56 So. 937 (1911).
50. See Note, The Standard of Care Owed by a Hospital to Its Patients, 2 VAND.
L. REv. 660, 671 (1949).
51. Id. at 669.
52. "The said defendant cannot absolve itself from the obligation it owed to the
ptaintiff patient to furnish him proper treatment, on the claim that the physicians who
treated him, at its instance, were independent contractors." Vaughan v. Memorial
Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S. E. 481, 482 (1925). And see Valentin v. La Societe
Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P. 2d 359 (1946); Brown v. La Societe Francaise,
;32 Cal. 475, 71 Pac. 516 (1903); Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanatorium, 224 Mo. App.
798, 24 S. W. 2d 249 (1929) ; Treptau v. Behrens Spa, Inc., 247 Wis. 438, 20 N. W.
2d 108 (1945).
53. Supra, note 44. See also Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P. 2d 372 (1944)
City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942); Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga.
App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923); Iterman v. Biker, 214 Ind. 308, 15 N. E. 2d 365(1938) ; Stacy v. Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. 2d 697 (1934); Stuart Circle I-los-
pital Corp. v. Curry, 173 Va. 136, 3 S. E. 2d 153 (1939).
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carelessly injures the patient? There is some difference of opinion about this
question. In the Massachusetts case discussed above, 54 the doctor was making
the examination, as Chief Justice Holmes said, "in order to advise and per-
haps to testify for the" employer. The Chief Justice then proceeded to em-
phasize that the doctor is an independent contractor; and he deemed that to
be sufficient ground for deciding the case against the injured patient. He took
no account of the possibility that an employer might be liable for acts of his
independent contractor.
Other courts, however, have charged the company when its doctor, while
serving the purpose of the company, has injured a patient. In a Minnesota
case55 the plaintiff had been injured while in the service of the defendant
company. The company's manager took the plaintiff to a physician who made
an X-ray picture of the plaintiff's sacroiliac joint-the part affected-and in
doing so burned the plaintiff. The court held the defendant company liable
for the injuries inflicted by the physician. Bunn, J. says: "There can be no
doubt that defendant wanted the picture for its own purposes, probably as
evidence in case plaintiff should bring suit against it to recover for the injury
received in the accident. . . .The doctor was the servant of defendant . ..
the rule of respondeat superior applies." 56 In this case the doctor was called a
"servant." That led to the desired result. The same result could have been
reached by sounder reasoning--viz., the doctor was an independent contrac-
tor, as most decisions indicate, but, considering the employer's purpose in
hiring the doctor to make the X-ray picture, the employer should be held.
In a West Virginia case 57 it appeared that the plaintiff had suffered an
injury and was seeking to recover from the defendant insurance company
on an accident policy. The company sent its medical adviser to examine the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's leg was in a cast. The doctor removed the cast in
order to make the examination and left without replacing the cast. Serious
injury resulted. The company was held liable on reasoning similar to that used
in the Minnesota case cited above.
Closely related to the cases where an employer hires a physician to ex-
amine a patient and get information for the employer are cases where the
doctor is hired to make representations to the employee and thus induce the
employee to settle a claim against the company. Here also is created a peculiar
risk to the patient. It is a risk that the patient may be misled by a misrepre-
sentation. In this group of cases'the employer is generally charged with the
doctor's misrepresentations. The question has often arisen in cases where an
employee has released the company because of representations made by the
54. Pearl v. West End St. Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339 (1900).
55. Jones v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., 118 Minn. 217, 136 N. W.
741 (1912).
56. 136 N. W. at 741.
57. Tompkins v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 479, 44 S. E. 439 (1903).
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company doctor. Such representations are ground for avoiding the release.5 8
The evidence in a case that was brought in a United States District Court
was to the effect that a company physician misrepresented to an injured em-
ployee the extent of his injuries, and that, on' the strength of what the physi-
cian said, the employee delayed filing his claim for compensation under the
Indiana Workmen's Compensation law until it was too late under the pro-
visions of the Statute. The District Court held that the company could be
charged with these representations made by its physician. The District Court
was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals.5 9 The defendant contended that
it was not bound by the representations made by its physician because the
physician was not its servant. Judge Treanor concedes that as a rule a physi-
cian is an independent contractor. "But," says the Judge, "the facts of the
instant case do not bring it within the foregoing rule. . . . [W]hen making
representations to an injured employee respecting his physical condition the
doctor is acting within the scope of his employment and performing a duty
of the employer; and false representations are imputed to the employer under
the law of respondeat superior. The test is not whether the doctor was spe-
cifically authorized to make fraudulent representations, but whether the false
representations were made within the scope of his employment. It is rarely
true that an agent is authorized to perform an act for his principal in a wrong
ful manner to the injury of a third person." 60 The opinion is not quite
consistent in branding the physician as an independent contractor and then
relying on the doctrine of Respondeat Superior. But the decision itself is con-
sistent with the idea that an employer should be held liable for representa-
tions it procures to be made for its own benefit by its independent contractor.
It can be said by way of summation of the physician cases that a majority
of the cases deem that a physician in the practice of his profession is an inde-
pendent contractor; and the liability of the employer of a physician depends
58. Tatman v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. R., 10 Del. 105, 85 At. 716 (1913) ; Haigh
v. White Way Laundry Co., 164 Iowa 143, 145 N. W. 473 (1914); Nason v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 140 Iowa 533, 118 N. W. 751 (1908) ; Nelson v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.,
111 Minn. 193, 126 N. W. 902 (1910); Carroll v. United Rys., 157 Mo. App. 247, 137
S. W. 303 (1911); Bunker v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 84 N. H. 84, 146 At. 529 (1929):
St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Richards, 23 Okla. 256, 102 Pac. 92 (1909); Kitchen v.
Miller Bros. Co., 115 Pa. Super. 141, 174 Atl. 919 (1934) ; Duncan v. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n, 105 S. W. 2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Maples,
162 S. W. 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Huyett, 49 Tex. Civ.
App. 395, 108 S. W, 502 (1908); Vialett v. Consolidated Ry. & P. Co., 30 Utah 260,
84 Pac. 496 (1906) ; Pattison v. Seattle R. & S. Ry., 55 Wash. 625, 104 Pac. 825 (1909).
The statement of an honest opinion by the doctor may fall short of being a repre-
sentation and for that reason will not affect the validity of a release. Nason v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 140 Iowa 533, 118 N. W. 751 (1908) ; Carroll v. United Rys., 157 Mo.
App. 247, 137 S. W. 303 (1911); Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Cole, 108 S. W. 2d
864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). If, however, a physician employed by the company falsely
represents that he entertains a stated opinion, this may be fraud and, if so, may be
charged to the company. Tattershall v. Yellow Cab. Co., 225 Mo. App. 611, 37 S. W.
2d 659 (1931); Yeager v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 223 Mo. App. 245, 12 S. W. 2d 520
(1929).
59. Woodburn v. Standard Forgings Co., 112 F. 2d 271 (7th Cir. 1940).
60. Id. at 274.
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on the principles applicable generally to the liability of employers for acts
of their independent contractors. One feature, especially pertinent to the
present discussion, is that an employer who, in order to serve his own pur-
pose, hires a physician to make representations to a third person is charged in
,case the representations turn out to be misrepresentations.
THE BROKER CASES
Consider the broker.61 In some instances he is an individual who could
act as a servant for a master, or he could act independently of the employer's
-control and thus be an independent contractor. In many cases the broker is a
-corporation having servants and 'agents of its own. Such an organization
-cannot be a servant to the employer. And persons within the broker's organi-
zation are not subject to control by the employer of the broker; they are not
his servants. But, conceding that a person who employs a broker is not liable
under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior, is he liable on other grounds for
misrepresentations made by the broker or the broker's servants?
The broker is employed to do one or both of two kinds of acts-vi-.,
(1) juristic acts, such as executing transfers or contracts to transfer prop-
erty; and (2) non-juristic acts, such as exhibiting property and persuading
customers to buy it. Our chief concern here is with the latter kind of acts-
i.e., with representations made in persuading customers to buy.
An appalling number of cases have come before the courts where the
purchasers of land have sought to charge sellers with misrepresentations made
by persons that were employed by the sellers to procure buyers. There is
great diversity of holdings among these cases. Some of the decisions can be
reconciled by differences in the facts involved. And courts sometimes make a
distinction that depends on the kind of relief being asked for by the persons
who have been misled by the misrepresentations. After making all possible
allowances, however, many decisions on this question are flatly contradictory.
Many hold the employer ;62 and many let him out.
63
61. Factors, banks and collection agencies hould, perhaps, be put in the same
category.
62. Turner v. Brewer, 298 Fed. 685 (D. C. Cir. 1924) ; Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser,
45 Fed. 730 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1891); Brennen v. Kent, 206 Ala. 561, 90 So. 790
(1921); Cady v. Rainwater, 129 Ark. 498, 196 S. W. 125 (1917); Mitchell v. Coleman,
127 Ark. 373, 192 S. W. 231 (1917); Vaught v. Paddock, 98 Ark. 10, 135 S. W. 331
(1911); Henrich v. Norton, 219 Il1. App. 86 (1920); Duiguid v. Coldsnow, 76 Ind.
App. 545, 132 N. E. 659 (1921) ; Day v. Merrick, 158 Iowa 287, 138 N. W. 400 (1912)
Rush v. Leavitt, 99 Kan. 498, 162 Pac. 310 (1917) ; Rhoda v. Annis, 75 Me. 17 (1883);
Purdum v. Edwards, 155 Md. 178, 141 Ati. 550 (1928); Dzuris v. Pierce, 216 Mass.
132, 103 N. E. 296 (1913); Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 25 N. E. 14 (1890);
White v. Sawyer, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 586 (1860); Chaffee v. Raymond, 241 Mich.
392, 217 N. W. 22 (1928); Smith v. Michigan Realty & Const. Co., 175 Mich. 600,
141 N. W. 635 (1913); Ballard v. Lyon, 114 Minn. 264, 131 N. W. 320 (1911);
Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Carson, 186 Mo. App. 221, 172 S. W. 69 (1914) ; Millard
v. Smith, 119 Mo. App. 701, 95 S. W. 940 (1906); Green v. Worman, 83 Mo. App.
568 (1900) ; Wolfersberger v. Miller, 327 Mo. 1150, 39 S. W. 2d 758 (1931); German
Centennial Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Googer, 117 N. J. Eq. 532, 176 Ati. 395 (1935) ; Thrams
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The decisions are not usually made to turn on the question of whether
the person who made the representation was a servant or an independent
contractor. "Although there seems reason for making a distinction between
real estate brokers and regular agents, such a distinction is very infrequently
made; the great majority of the cases consider brokers the same as other
agents." 64 While the courts find no practical advantage in distinguishing the
two types of cases it is obvious that there is a different theoretical basis for
holding the employer in cases where the misrepresentation was made by his
servant, and in cases where the misrepresentation was made by a broker act-
ing as an independent contractor. When the representation has been made by
his servant, the doctrine of Respondeat Superior applies. But, where the
broker is an independent contractor, the employer's liability depends on an-
other principle-his duty, when he procures a representation to be made to
a prospective buyer to have it truly and accurately made. These broker cases
afford another important illustration of the idea that when an employer to
serve his own ends procures an independent contractor to make a represen-
tation that will likely be acted on by the person addressed, he should be
v. Block, 43 N. Mex. 117, 86 P. 2d 938 (1938); Sandford v. Handy, 23 Wend. 260
(N. Y. 1840); Bunting v. Creglow, 40 N. D. 98, 168 N. W. 727 (1918); Firebough
v. Bentley, 65 Ore. 170, 130 Pac. 1129 (1913); Copeland v. Tweedle, 61 Ore. 303, 122
Pac. 302 (1912); McNeile v. Cridland, 168 Pa. 16, 31 Atl. 939 (1895) ; Sutton v.
Morgan, 158 Pa. 204, 27 Atl. 894 (1893); Caughron v. Stinespring, 132 Tenn. 636,
179 S. W. 152 (1915); Sargent v. Barnes, 159 S. W. 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913);
Martin v. Ince, 148 S. W. 1178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Kleine Bros. v. Gidcomb, 152
S. W. 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Wimple v. Patterson, 117 S. W. 1034 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1909); Farris v. Gilder, 115 S. W. 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) ; Yarnall v. Knicker-
bocker Co., 120 Wash. 205, 206 Pac. 936 (1922); O'Daniel v. Streeby, 77 Wash. 414,
137 Pac. 1025 (1914); Smith v. Gray, 52 Wash. 255, 100 Pac. 339 (1909); Nelson v.
Title Trust Co., 52 Wash. 258, 100 Pac. 730 (1909) ; Shepard v. Pabst, 149 Wis. 35,
135 N. W. 158 (1912) ; Stelting v. Bank of Sparta, 136 Wis. 369, 117 N. W. 798 (1908) ;
Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis. 220, 52 N. W. 88 (1892); McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis.
82, 43 N. W. 800 (1889); Mullens v. Miller, 22 Ch. Div. 194 (1882).
63. Nupen v. Pearce, 235 Fed. 497 (8th Cir. 1916); Janeczko v. Manheimer, 77
F. 2d 205 (7th Cir. 1935); Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., 33 Ariz. 101, 261 Pac.
969 (1928); Mortimer v. Young, 37 Cal. App. 2d 164, 98 Pac. 2d 1061 (1940); May,
v. Wahlgreen, 9 Colo. App. 506, 50 Pac. 40 (1897) ; Dellwo v. Petersen, 32 Idaho 172,
180 Pac. 167 (1919) ; Ringer v. Wilkin, 32 Idaho 330, 183 Pac. 986 (1919) ; Ellison v.
Stockton, 185 Iowa 979, 170 N. W. 435 (1919); Harrigan v. Dodge, 216 Mass. 461,
103 N. E. 919 (1914) ; Luff v. Nevins, 106 N. J, Eq. 386, 150 Atl. 834 (1930) ; Austin
J. Waldron, Inc., v. Cutley, 105 N. 3. Eq. 586, 144 At. 447 (1929); National Iron
Armor Co. v. Bruner, 19 N. J. Eq. 331 (1868); Montague v. Bank for Savings, 43
N. Y. S. 2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Friedman v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 256 N. Y. 392,
176 N. E. 543 (1931); Hodson v. Wells & Dickey Co., 31 N. D. 395, 154 N. W. 193(1915) ; Dieterle v. Bourne, 57 N. E. 2d 405 (Ohio App. 1943); Mutual Home &
Say. Ass'n v. Westgerdes, 35 N. E. 2d 882 (Ohio App. 1941); Freyer v. McCord, 165
Pa. 539, 30 At. 1024 (1895) ; Loma Vista Development Co. v. Johnson, 142 Tex. 686,
180 S. W. 2d 922 (1944); Lemarb v. Power, 151 Wash. 273, 275 Pac. 561 (1929);
Gudmundson v. Commercial B. & T. Co., 138 Wash. 355, 244 Pac. 676 (1926) ; Johnson
v. Williams, 133 Wash. 613, 234 Pac. 449 (1925); Samson v. Beale, 27 Wash. 557,
68 Pac. 180 (1902).
64. Note, L. R. A. 1917F 962. The writer of a later note also says: "Cases are
included where the person acting as a broker is referred to as a broker, and also where
he is referred to as an agent. In this regard no distinction is made, unless it is made
in the particular case." 57 A. L. R. 111 (1928).
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charged in case the independent contractor carelessly or willfully turns it into
a misrepresentation.
What about the justice and expediency of charging the employer with
false representations made by his broker acting as an independent contractor?
The representation is made for the benefit of the employer just as surely as
though it were made by the employer's servant; and a false representation
is equally damaging to the person addressed whether made by a servant or an
independent contractor. The employer should not be allowed to insulate him-
self from liability by the simple expedient of hiring an independent con-
tractor instead of a servant to make representations for him.65 "[I]t would,"
says Dunbar, J., "tend to encourage fraudulent misrepresentation if such
owner were allowed to escape responsibility through the subterfuge of having
the sale made by a sub-agent. '66
An employer, of course, is not liable for a misrepresentation unless it
fell within the scope of the employment of the person who made it. In some
cases it has been found that the broker was not employed to "sell," in the
sense of persuade a customer.6 7 The court, in such a case, said that the broker
was merely a "discoverer or finder."' 68 That is, he was to seek a potential
buyer and bring him and the seller together-when, presumably, they would
make their own representations.
Courts have been influenced in a good many cases against holding the
employer for a broker's misrepresentation because they looked to find "au-
thority" in the broker instead of looking to find "employment. '69 Failing to
find such authority, they have held that the employer was not liable.70 Why do
courts look to find authority? Because they fail to fhote the distinctness be-
tween (1) the acts that a servant or independent, contractor does by way of
persuading a customer to buy, and (2) the act of an agent in transferring or
65. Harper, The Basis of the Iinzunity of an Employer of an Independent Con-
tractor, 10 IND. L. J. 494, 498 (1935); Morris, The Torts of an Independent Con-
tractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 339 (1934).
66. Nelson v. Title Trust Co., 52 Wash. 258, 100 Pac. 730, 731 (1909).
67. Montague v. Bank for Savings in City of N. Y., 43 N. Y. S. 2d 321 (Sup.
Ct. 1943); Friedman v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 256 N. Y. 392, 176 N. E. 543 (1931);
Lansing v. Colman, 58 Barb. 611, 619 (N. Y. 1871); Dieterle v. Bourne, 57 N. E.
2d 405 (Ohio App. 1943).
68. Montague v. Bank for Savings in City of New York, 43, N. Y. S 2d 321 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
69. Woodburn v. Standard Forzings Co., 112 F. 2d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 1940) ("It
i rarely true that an agent is authorized to perform an act for lis principal in a
wrongful manner to the injury of a third person.") ; Janeczko v. Manheimer, 77 F. 2d
205 (7th Cir. 1935) ; Ellison v. Stockton, 185 Iowa 979, 170 N. W. 435 (1919) ; Note
57 A. L. R. 111, 112 (1928) ("The result of sustaining the authority often is to impose
upon the owner a burden clearly beyond that which the agent had either actual or
ostensible authority to impose by any contract with the purchaser of the land .... Even
where the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the
actual value of the land, it cannot be said that the agent had either the implied or
ostensible authority to bind his principal for this amount.")
70. Light v. Chandler Improvement Co., 33 Ariz. 101, 261 Pac. 969 (1928): Loma
Vista Development Co. v. Johnson, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S. W. 2d 922 (1944); Lemarb
v. Power, 151 Wash. 273, 275 Pac. 561 (1929).
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contracting to transfer the property. Both types of acts are called "selling"
and there is a tendency to lump them together. But persuading a customer to
buy is a different kind of an act from executing a contract or transfer. The
former is a non-juristic act and calls only for employment of the servant or
independent contractor. The latter kind of act is juristic; it calls for authority
from the constituent.7 1 It may seem pedantic to make this distinction. But
lumping the two kinds of acts that are so utterly dissimilar gives only an illu-
sion of simplicity. In the long run it conduces to simplicity and clarity to
make the distinction and note its implications. It should be remembered that
the binding effect of a transfer or contract derives from the principal's mani-
fested consent that he should be bound; while an employer's liability for mis-
representations made by his servant or independent contractor is-like other
tort liability--imposed upon him regardless of his consent.
A few courts have taken the position that the employer should not be
held liable for a misrepresentation where the broker is employed only to pro-
cure a buyer.72 How, it may be asked, is he to procure that buyer? Surely
the making of representations constitutes a large part of the work he is em-
ployed to do.
As noted above,73 there is contrariety of opinions in this group of cases.
It would seem, however, to be rational, expedient and just that when a mis-
representation has been made by a broker, hired by the seller to procure a
customer, the seller should be charged with it.
Insurance brokers frequently represent the insured. In such a case the
representations of the broker are imputable to the insured,74 and representa-
71. Employment and authority alike derive from the consent of the constituent, i.e.,
the master or principal. But his consent is, and needs to be, more extensive in the
creation of authority than it does in the creation of employment. In the case of em-
ployment the constituent simply consents that the servant or independent contractor
shall do this act or class of acts for him. He need not consent to be liable for what
the servant or independent contractor does. That liability is thrust upon him regardless
of his consent. In conferring authority, however, the constituent consents (a) that the
agent can do such and such an act for him and (b) that he, the constituent, shall be
bound when (i.e., on condition that) the agent does the specified act. For a more de-
tailed discussion of this distinction, see FERSON, RATIONAL BASIS OF CONTRAcrs, C. 12
(1949).
72. "Their authority was simply to make a sale, or procure a purchaser who was
ready, able, and willing to buy." Ellison v. Stockton, 185 Iowa 989, 170 N. W. 435.
437 (1919) (italics added). In Johnson v. Williams, 133 Wash. 613, 234 Pac. 449
(1925), an owner authorized a broker to "find a purchaser." The broker's salesman,
Vincent, was alleged to have made false representations regarding the quality and
earning power of the property. The court held no recovery; the "authority of Coonse,
Taylor & Bond, and Vincent, their salesman, was nothing more than their authority to
find a purchaser." In Samson v. Beale, 27 Wash. 557, 68 Pac. 180 (1902), it was held
that, since the broker had no power to convey, his representations would not bind the
employer. Says Hadley, J., "The effect of the above decisions establishes the rule in this
state that such authority as was shown in the case at bar goes no further than to
authorize the finding of a purchaser. Representations made by an agent under such
circumstances are not binding upon the principal." 68 Pac. at 184.
73. See notes 60 and 61, supra.
74. Young v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 59 Conn. 41, 22 Atl. 32 (1890); Rosedale
Securities Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 120 Kan. 415, 243 Pac. 1023 (1926): Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502 (1877); Standard Oil v. Triumph, 64 N. Y. 85
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tions by a broker who represents the insurer can be charged to the insurer.' 5
Representations made by a collection agency may estop the employer of the
agency. 76
An insurance company is surely not a servant of the insured, and serv-
ants of the company are not servants of the insured. With that in mind, con-
sider the case of Ha'yes v. Gessner :77 The plaintiff had been injured by an
automobile driven by the defendant. The defendant carried liability insurance
and by the terms of the policy gave the insuring company the sole right of
settlement and defense. One Murdoch, an employee of the insuring company,
made false representations to the plaintiff whereby he was persuaded to delay
bringing suit until after his claim had become barred. The court held that
the defendant was.estopped by these representations that had been made by
Murdoch, servant of the insuring company.
NEWSPAPER CASES
There are a few pertinent newspaper cases which need to be considered.
In a Wisconsin case 78 the evidence tended to show that the" defendant,
having written an article in English, sent it to the proprietoe of a German
newspaper for publication. He thus procured to be made in German -repre-
sentations about the plaintiff, a member of the State Senate. The proprietor
of the paper had the article translated into German "by a person whom he
[the proprietor of the paper] kept in his employ for such purposes." The
translation thus made was published. It was not a correct translation of the
original copy. The article as published defamed the plaintiff. The defendant
sought to escape liability on the ground that he could not read, write, speak
or understand the German language and that he should not be held responsi-
ble for a publication that differed in substance from the article he sent in for
publication. The court took the view that this was not a defense. "We see,"
said Lyon, J., "no valid reason why the maxim Respondeat Superior should
not be applied here. That an agent may be employed to translate written pro-
ductions from one language to another, and to publish the same as translated,
seems too clear for argument; and if this may be done, on what theory can
we say that the legal incidents which attach to the relation of principal and
agent in other cases, do not attach in this case? The doctrine that the princi-
pal is liable to third persons for all damages sustained by them by the negli-
gence or unskillfulness of his agent in the course of his employment, is
elementary and of universal application.
'79
(1876); Cole v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 36, 1 N. E. 38 (1885); Wolowitch
v. National Surety, 152 App. Div. 14, 136 N. Y. Supp. 793 (1st Dep't 1912).
75. Riddle v. Rankin, 146 Kan. 316, 69 P. 2d 722 (1937).
76. Rock v. Security National Bank, 53 N. D. 718, 207 N. W. 487 (1926).
77. 315 Mass. 366, 52 N. E. 2d 968 (1944)..
78. Wilson v. Noonan, 27 Wis. 598 (1871).
79. Id. at 608.
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The court seems right in holding the author to account. But was either
the proprietor or his translator really a servant of the defendant? He had
no right to control either one; it would seem to follow that neither one was.
his servant. The relation of the proprietor to the defendant was that of an
"independent contractor." The court seems to have stretched and warped the
concept "servant," to reach the desired result of holding the author who
procured the representation to be made. A more rational basis for the decision
would seem to be this: The defendant procured the representation to be
made in German. He did this for reasons of his own and without the consent
of the plaintiff. It is rational that the defendant should be under a duty to the
plaintiff, about whom the representation was made, and whose reputation was.
at stake, that the representation should be carefully made, The fact that the
author procured an independent contractor to make the representation should
not excuse him.
In another newspaper case 80 the author sent an item for publication which
would have been innocent if properly located in the paper. In this case,
however, the publisher or his servant placed the item in a certain column
where, because of its association with other items, it became libellous. The
author who sent in the item was held liable even though neither he nor any
servant of his had anything to do with the placement of the item. That was.
done by the independent contractor or his servant.
CONCLUSION
The association of the above groups of cases may be unusual. It can be
seen, however, that there is one thread that runs through all of them. In the
telegraph cases the representation with regard to an offer may induce the
addressee to "accept"--i.e., to transfer property, assume obligation or other-
wise change his position; it is procured to be made for that purpose. In the
physician cases the representation about the patient's condition may persuade
him to reduce or give up his claim against the employer for compensation.
In the real estate broker cases the representation may induce the person ad-
dressed to part with his money in exchange for land; the representation is
procured to be made for that purpose. In the newspaper cases the representa-
tion about another person may defame him.
A broad view of the cases reveals a rugged and sensible principle to this
effect: A person who, for his own benefit, procures a representation to be
made to someone, or about someone, is under a duty to the person likely
to be affected that the representation shall be carefully made. Such an em-
ployer is, accordingly, chargeable with the representation as it is actually
made.
80. Zier v. Hoflin, 33 Minn. 66, 2"1 N. W. 862 (1885).
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An independent contractor who has made a misrepresentation is some-
times called a "servant" although the employer had not a right to control his
behavior. He is sometimes called an "agent" although the employer gave
him no authority to make the representation. There has been a fancied need
that the independent contractor must be called "servant" or "agent" in order
to charge the employer with his misrepresentations. There is no real need
for such a pretext. The general principles developed by many writers-"
relative to the employer's liability for acts of his independent contractor
amply cover the groups of cases discussed above. One of the main principles
brought out by these writers is to the effect that an employer who bargains
with an independent contractor to have created a special and foreseeable risk
that certain persons or groups of persons may be injured is liable if the
foreseeable injury occurs. That general principle seems especially apposite
when an employer, for his own benefit, procures representations to be made
to a third person with a view to influencing the third person's conduct. The
particular person is contemplated; indeed he is the target. There is not only
a chance he may be affected; that is the purpose. The risk that he may be
misled is not dim or collateral; it is clear and inherent in the enterprise.
81. HARPER, TORTS § 292 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (1941); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS §§ 416-29 (1934); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38
YALE L. J. 584 (1929); Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an
Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L. J. 494 (1935); McCleary, Liability of an Employer
for the Negligence of an Independent Contractor in Missouri, 18 ST. Louis L. REV.
289 (1933) ; Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractdr, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934) ;
Smith, Collateral Negligence, 25 MINN. L. REv. 399 (1941); Steffen. Independent Con-
Iractoi and the Good Life, 2 U. OF C1ir. L. REv. 501 (1935).
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